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A. INTRODUCTION
Independence and impartiality of arbitrators are derived from their
essential obligation towards the arbitrating parties, which is the
adjudication of the dispute submitted to their jurisdiction in the
arbitration agreement. This obligation is an accepted principle of
arbitration laws in Europe.1 The relationships between the parties to
the arbitration and the arbitrators themselves are in the nature of a
contract, as can be deduced from the bilateral source of an
arbitrator’s appointment, even when nomination is made at the
initiative of one party, such as the nomination of a co-arbitrator.
Thus, the choice of an arbitrator by one party is part of a contractual
scheme between the parties and the arbitrator.2
The United Kingdom Supreme Court highlighted in Jivraj v.
Hashwani3 that, “[i]t is common ground, at any rate in this class of
case, that there is a contract between the parties and the arbitrator or

* Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeals in France and adjunct professor of
law at University Panthéon-Sorbonne.
1. See, e.g., L’impartialité du juge et de l’arbitre, Etude de droit comparé, J.
van Compernolle, dir. Bruylant, 2006.
2. THOMAS CLAY, L’ARBITRE [THE ARBITRATOR] 482 (2001).
3. Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2011] UKSC 40, [23] (appeal taken from Eng.).
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arbitrators appointed under a contract and that his or their services
are rendered pursuant to that contract.” As explained by the Cour de
cassation in a judgment delivered in 1972 in the Consorts Ury case in
France, “[t]he appointment of each arbitrator is not a unilateral act,
even when initiated by one party alone. [It] results from the common
intention of the parties, who take into account the qualities of the
person whom they call upon to judge their dispute.”4 Similarly, in
Raffineries de Homs, the Paris First Instance Court decided that “[a]n
arbitrator – who is a judge, not a representative of the party that
appointed him – must derive his judicial powers from a single,
common manifestation of the intentions of the parties to the
arbitration proceedings, even though his appointment may have been
initiated by one party alone.”5
This view is also propounded by Phillipe Fouchard in his Report
to the ICC on the status of arbitrators in 1995:
[t]he settlement of a dispute is not an ‘undertaking’ or a ‘work’ as such.
Admittedly, the arbitrator is bound to comply with [the] arbitration
agreement and rules that the parties have adopted, but the parties are not
allowed to go so far as to give him instructions on the manner in which he
is to conduct the proceedings, less still in relation to the direction or
content of his decision.6

The judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court clarifies in
Jivraj7 that an arbitrator is not a person employed under a contract to
do work within the meaning of the Regulations 2003 on Employment
Equality. The Court states,
[t]he arbitrator is in critical respects independent of the parties. His
functions and duties require him to rise above the partisan interests of the
parties and not to act in, or so as to further, the particular interests of

4. FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 575 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) (quoting Cour
de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Apr. 13, 1972,
JCP 1972, II, 17189 (Fr.)).
5. Id. (quoting Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original
jurisdiction] Paris, Mar. 28, 1984, 1985 REV. ARB. 141 (Fr.)).
6. Phillipe Fouchard, Les Rapports entre L’arbitre et les Parties et
L’institution Arbitrale [Relationships Between the Arbitrator and the Parties and
the Arbitral Institution], in BULLETIN DE LA COUR INTERNATIONALE D’ARBITRAGE
DE LA CCI, LE STATUT DE L’ARBITRE: SUPPLEMENT SPECIAL 12, 16 (1995).
7. Jivraj, [2011] UKSC, [41].
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either party. As the International Chamber of Commerce (“the ICC”) puts
it, he must determine how to resolve their competing interests. He is in no
sense in a position of subordination to the parties.8

The Fouchard Report further stresses that, “[s]uch a classification
[as an agency contract] is arguable, since the very purpose of an
agency is to grant the agent a power of representation. Yet, the
arbitrator does not represent the parties, less still the party that
appointed him; the power he is granted is inherently judicial.”9 The
Court of Appeal of Paris also held that far from being an agent of the
parties, an arbitrator is an adjudicator.10 Fouchard suggests that the
contract between the parties to the arbitration and the arbitrators has
a sui generis form: “[I]ndeed the contractual relationship formed
between the arbitrator and the parties cannot be categorized as a
known type of civil contract. This contract contains the mixed
characteristics of arbitration – contractual in source, judicial in
object.”11 His views on the nature of the contract have been endorsed
in national case law. Characterization of the contract as a sui generis
form of agreement has been adopted by the Court of Appeal of
Paris12 and in the concurring opinion of Lord Mance in Jivraj v.
Hashwani.13
Arbitrators serve an adjudicatory role and, as a result, must be
independent of the parties and impartial.14 According to a recent
holding of the UK Supreme Court in the case of Jivraj v. Hashwani,
[t]he dominant purpose of appointing an arbitrator is the impartial
resolution of dispute between the parties in accordance with the terms of
the agreement and, although the contract between the parties and the
arbitrators would be a contract for the provision of personal services, they

8. Id.
9. Fouchard, supra note 6, at 15.
10. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, May 22, 1991, 1e ch.,
1996 REV. ARB. 476 (Fr.).
11. Fouchard, supra note 6, at 16.
12. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] 1e civ., Paris, Dec. 13, 2001,
2003 REV. ARB. 1312 (Fr.).
13. Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2011] UKSC 40, [77] (appeal taken from Eng.).
14. See Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original
jurisdiction] Paris, Oct. 28, 1988, 1990 REV. ARB. 497 (Fr.) (recognizing that
arbitrators, in executing their judicial function, must be independent and impartial
to assure equitable treatment and process).
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were not personal services under the direction of the parties.15

Similarly, in the Consorts Ury judgment of 1972,16 the Cour de
cassation underlined that “[a]n independent mind is indispensable in
the exercise of judicial power, whatever the source of that power
may be, [and it is] one of the essential qualities of an arbitrator.”17
Admittedly, an independent arbitrator is typically impartial. An
arbitrator may, however, be independent and yet, lack impartiality, or
vice versa. Impartiality, as is well accepted, is a more subjective
concept as compared to independence.18 Independence, which is
more an objective concept, may thus be more straightforwardly
ascertained by the parties at the outset of the arbitration proceedings
in light of the circumstances disclosed by the arbitrator, while
partiality will more likely surface during the arbitration proceedings.
As the English Arbitration Act of 1996,19 which makes no reference
to independence, illustrates, impartiality is the crucial requirement
and cannot be waived in advance by parties. As with English law,
independence is required of all arbitrators in the majority of other
national arbitration laws and many arbitration rules as well.20
Through an exploration of case law, particularly case law and
procedures in France, this paper will discuss an arbitrator’s duty to
disclose, what an arbitrator should disclose, and how and when an
institutional decision on the independence and impartiality of
arbitrators should take place.

B. AN ARBITRATOR’S DUTY TO DISCLOSE
Execution of the contract between the parties to the arbitration and
15. Jivraj, [2011] UKSC, [45].
16. Galliard & Savage, supra note 4, at 562 (quoting Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Apr. 13, 1972, JCP 1972, II, 17189
(Fr.)).
17. Id.
18. Pierre Lalive, Conclusions, in INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
THE ARBITRAL PROCESS AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF ARBITRATORS 119–20 (1991).
19. See generally Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23 (U.K.) (referencing the nonwaivable requirement of “impartiality” but omitting any reference to
“independence”).
20. JEANFRANÇOIS POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, DROIT COMPARÉ DE
L’ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL [COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION] 366–70 (2002).
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each arbitrator requires consent of all involved.21 Parties to the
arbitration can, however, accept the nomination of an arbitrator if
and when they are made aware of the connections which the
proposed arbitrator may have with the other parties, their counsel,
and, possibly, the other members of the Arbitral Tribunal.22
Independence is a requirement that is in the parties’ interest and
which they may waive as acknowledged in the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights.23 It is also accepted in French
arbitration law that the parties may waive the independence of the
arbitrators, but they can only do so to the extent they are aware of the
existing relationships of the arbitrators with the parties or with the
parties’ counsel.24 In light of the preceding, an arbitrator’s duty to
disclose is an essential undertaking for the independent and impartial
resolution of the dispute. It has been characterized as the
“[c]ornerstone of an arbitrator’s duty of independence. . . .”25
Currently, disclosure is acknowledged in contemporary arbitration
law and practice.26 The obligation to disclose and to investigate
21. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ.,
Apr. 13, 1972, JCP 1972, II, 17189 (Fr.); see also Galliard & Savage, supra note 4,
at 31 (stating that “[t]he contract between the parties is the fundamental constituent
of international arbitration. It is the parties’ common intention which confers
powers upon the arbitrators.”).
22. Cf. GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, § 4(c)(ii) (Council of the Int’l Bar Ass’n 2004) [hereinafter IBA
GUIDELINES] (“All parties must expressly agree that such person may serve as
arbitrator despite the conflict of interest.”).
23. Suovaniemi v. Finland, App. No. 31737/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=669102&po
rtal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C116
6DEA398649.
24. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Nov. 18, 2004,
2004 REV. ARB. 989 (Fr.).
25. Ahmed S. El-Kosheri & Karim Y. Youssef, The Independence of
International Arbitrators: An Arbitrator’s Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INDEPENDENCE OF ARBITRATORS: 2007 SPECIAL
SUPPLEMENT 43, 51 (2008).
26. See, e.g., Anne Marie Whitesell, Independence in ICC Arbitration: ICC
Court Practice Concerning the Appointment, Confirmation, Challenge and
Replacement of Arbitrators, in INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
INDEPENDENCE OF ARBITRATORS: 2007 SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT 7, 11 (2008)
(discussing that in ICC procedure, “[i]n the event of acceptance, the arbitrator must
also ‘disclose in writing to the Secretariat any facts or circumstances which might
be of such a nature as to call into question the arbitrator’s independence in the eyes
of the parties.’”).
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potential conflicts rests primarily on the arbitrator.27 A lawyer acting
as an arbitrator should perform a conflicts search to inquire about a
client-law firm relationship and the parties involved in the
arbitration. It should not be permitted for an arbitrator to be declared
independent based on the arbitrator’s lack of actual knowledge due to
a failure to perform a conflict search.28
The General Standard 7(a) of the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of
Interest in International Arbitration of 22 May 2004 provides that,
[a] party shall inform the arbitrator, the Arbitral Tribunal, the other parties
and the arbitration institution or other appointing authority (if any) about
any direct or indirect relationship between it (or another company of the
same group of companies) and the arbitrator. The party shall do so at its
own initiative before the beginning of the proceedings or as soon as it
becomes aware of such relationship.29

This should not be seen as a dilution of the arbitrator’s obligation to
disclose, but rather as a possibility for the parties to make their own
investigation when difficulties arise regarding the arbitrator’s
disclosure, such as incomplete statements or hesitations on the part
of the arbitrator.30 General Standard 7(b) specifies that, “[a] party
shall provide any information already available to it and shall
perform a reasonable search of publicly available information.”31 In
the case of the non-disclosure of a fact that is known by the arbitrator
and a party, shared liability between them could be considered. As
between the parties, the other party may claim for a breach of the
obligation of loyalty, which flows from the arbitration agreement.
The duty to disclose does not merge in the obligation to be and
27. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Dec. 18, 2003, RG n°
2002/09750, Annahold.
28. See IBA GUIDELINES, supra note 22, § 7(c) (stating that a “[f]ailure to
disclose a potential conflict is not excused by lack of knowledge if the arbitrator
makes no reasonable attempt to investigate.”). See generally Arthur W. Rovine &
Christopher Chinn, The International Arbitrator’s Duty to Investigate Conflicts:
The United States Approach, 5 TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT. 1 (2008) (discussing
various bar associations’ requirements that arbitrators make reasonable
investigations into conflicts of interest).
29. IBA GUIDELINES, supra note 22, § 7(a).
30. See id. § 7 cmt. (“It is the arbitrator or putative arbitrator’s obligation to
make similar enquiries and to disclose any information that may cause his or her
impartiality or independence to be called into question.”).
31. Id. § 7(b).
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remain independent. The essential requirement is the honesty with
which the arbitrator should disclose in order to permit the parties to
concretely assess his or her situation in the parties’ eyes.
Nonetheless, an erroneous or otherwise incomplete statement should
not automatically lead to a recusal of the arbitrator or to annulment
of the award. According to the Supreme Court of the United States,
“[A]rbitrators are not automatically disqualified by a business
relationship with the parties before them if both parties are informed
of the relationship in advance, or if they are unaware of the facts but
the relationship is trivial.”32 In such case, the judge will assess the
impact that may be reasonably expected in the parties’ eyes of such
situation on the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator.33
Should the obligation to disclose be more stringent concerning the
chair of the arbitral tribunal or the sole arbitrator than regarding coarbitrators? International arbitration law and practice make no
distinction among members of an arbitral tribunal who all perform an
adjudicative role.34 The case law of the Court of Appeal of Paris has
given its greatest extent to the duty of independence by considering
an arbitrator under the same obligation as a judge in this regard:
“[T]he independence of the arbitrator is essential to his judicial role,
in that from the time of his appointment he assumes the status of a
judge, which excludes any relation of dependence, particularly with
the parties.”35
Equating an arbitrator to a judge appears to be at variance with
practice.36 Nomination of a co-arbitrator, as is widely known and
accepted, has been described in the famous words of a reputed
practitioner, Martin Hunter, “[w]hen I am representing a client in
arbitration, what I am really looking for in a party nominated
arbitrator is someone with the maximum predisposition towards my
client, but with the minimum appearance of bias.”37 Professor
32. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150
(1968) (White, J., concurring).
33. Qatar v. Creighton, Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e
ch., Jan. 12, 1996, 1996 REV. ARB. 428 (Fr.).
34. POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 20, at 366.
35. Galliard & Savage, supra note 4, at 565 (quoting Cour d’appel [CA]
[regional court of appeal] Paris, June 2, 1989, 1991 REV. ARB. 87 (Fr.)).
36. P. BELLET, DES ARBITRES NEUTRES ET NON NEUTRES, ETUDES EN
L’HONNEUR DE PIERRE LALIVE, HELBING AND LICHTENHAHN 399 (1993).
37. M. Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, The Journal of the
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Fadlallah has described that “[a] system whereby each of the parties
chooses an arbitrator is hardly likely to result in a tribunal which is
totally indifferent to the parties and their concern.”38 Professor El
Kosheri and Mr. Karim Youssef write: “[P]arties commonly have a
two-fold approach to independence. They have a legitimate
expectation of independence and judge-like behavior from the
arbitrator appointed by the opposing party, while they expect
partiality from their own arbitrator.”39 As compared, the parties are
less likely to waive the independence of the chair of the Tribunal or
of the sole arbitrator, as this would otherwise result in an imbalance
in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal which would threaten the
equilibrium between parties. Because the chair or sole arbitrator
guarantees that the arbitral tribunal as a whole functions in an
impartial manner, the obligation to disclose should be considered
with higher standards.40

C. WHAT AN ARBITRATOR SHOULD DISCLOSE
An exercise of practical guidance to what an arbitrator should
disclose is given in the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in
International Arbitration of 22 May 2004.41 French case law
traditionally holds that,
[a]n arbitrator is under a duty to disclose all circumstances which may
reasonably call into question his independence in the mind of the parties
and should particularly inform the parties of any relationship which is not
common knowledge and which could be reasonably expected to have an

Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, November 1987, p. 219.
38. Ibrahim Fadlallah, L’ordre Public Dans Les Sentences Arbitrales [Public
Order in Awards], 249 HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT’L L. 369, 379 (1994).
39. El-Kosheri & Youssef, supra note 25, at 47–48.
40. Cf. Neil Kaplan & Karen Mills, The Role of the Chair in International
Commercial Arbitration, in THE ASIAN LEADING ARBITRATOR’S GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 119 (Michael Pryles & Michael J. Moser eds.,
2007) (“[The Chair] must oversee all administrative matters as well as procedural
and substantive matters; be the key liaison among the parties and the other
arbitrators, between the tribunal and the administering institution, if any, and
sometimes must even mediate between the other arbitrators where not everyone
sees eye to eye.”).
41. See IBA GUIDELINES, supra note 22, pt. 2 (listing and categorizing what an
arbitrator should disclose).
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impact on his judgment in the parties’ eyes.42

The duty to disclose is widely recognized and easy to formulate,43
but its application to concrete circumstances is subject to discussion.
The Nidera v. Leplatre judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal on
December 16, 2010, illustrates a widely known judgment that
renders pointless the arbitrator’s duty to disclose. The claimant
argued that one co-arbitrator had not disclosed that he was the
chairman of a professional association of which the defendant was a
member. The Court of Appeal found that this situation was publicly
known by all involved in agricultural trade, including the applicant,
and underlined that the defendant was one among the eight hundred
competing members of the professional association chaired by the
co-arbitrator. As a consequence, claimant’s objection to the
regularity of the constitution of the arbitral tribunal as a ground for
annulment of the award was rejected. The situation was close to
giving rise to an estoppel as the Court of Appeal remarked that
Nidera had not challenged the chairman of the tribunal during the
arbitration proceedings in spite of this publicly known fact.44 Another
example is when the relationship is trivial and no disclosure is
needed, such as in Tecso, where the chairman of the Arbitral
Tribunal was a friend on Facebook of the defendant’s counsel. The
Court of Appeal held that this circumstance had no bearing on the
arbitrator’s independence or impartiality.
The relationship of an arbitrator with another member of the same
arbitral tribunal may raise questions of his or her impartiality if such
relationships result in the expression of one single opinion that is
42. See, for example, the judgments of the Court d’appel of Paris on September
9, 2010, in Allaire v. SGS Holding and of March 10, 2011, in Allaire, Nykcool v.
Dole France and Agrunord et al., and in Tecso v. Neoelectra Group. Cour d’appel
[CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, June 2, 1989, 1991 REV. ARB. 87 (Fr.)).
43. The new Article 1456 of the French Code of Civil Procedure spells out
after the January 13, 2011 Reform that “[b]efore accepting a mandate, an arbitrator
shall disclose any circumstances that may affect his or her independence or
impartiality. He or she shall disclose promptly any such circumstance that may
arise after accepting the mandate.” CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1456 (Fr.).
44. Article 1466 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that after the reform
of January 2011, “[a] party which, knowingly and without a legitimate reason, fails
to object to an irregularity before the arbitral tribunal in a timely manner shall be
deemed to have waived its right to avail itself of such irregularity.” C. CIV. art.
1466.
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counted twice instead of the addition of two independent opinions, as
should be the case.45 In the Emivir, Loniewski, Gauthier v. ITM
judgment of July 2011, the relationship between the chairman of the
arbitral tribunal and a co-arbitrator was under attack by the applicant,
who claimed that it cast doubt on the impartiality of the entire
arbitral tribunal. The applicant contended that the regular
contribution of the chairman to a law review on the editorial board of
which a co-arbitrator sat created an intellectual and pecuniary link
between them. The Court of Appeal of Paris answered that there is
no interference between the duties of an arbitrator and participation
in a law review and, consequently, held that neither a relationship of
subordination nor a business relationship could be said to exist as
claimed by Emivir et al. The Court concluded that, in the
circumstances of the case, there was no proof of actual bias on the
part of the chairman of the tribunal in the eyes of a fair-minded
observer. This reference to a third-party observer departs from the
reference generally made to the parties’ mind or the parties’ eyes. It
should be said that the test for disclosure is not about what the
arbitrator may think about his or her situation but, rather, about what
may raise a reasonable suspicion in the parties’ mind as to the
independence and impartiality of the arbitrator.46 However,
arbitrators may find it difficult to discover what is in the parties’
mind. Reference to a fair-minded observer, which should be taken to
mean a fair-minded or reasonable party, brings some objectivity in
an otherwise overly subjective exercise for the arbitrator. In the
circumstances of the Emivir case, the Court said that there was no
obligation for the chairman to disclose his participation in the law
review to the parties.
If we now turn to case law concerning non-trivial conflicts of
interest, the globalization of world trade and commerce also concerns
45. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Jan.
29, 2002, JCP 2003, I, 105, obs. J. Béguin (Fr.).
46. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,
Mar. 16, 1999, 1999 REV. ARB. 308 (Fr.) (noting that the duty of the judge on
appeal is to assess whether the circumstances were likely to cause either party to
have a reasonable doubt as to the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator);
see also Rep. of the Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 43d Sess., June 21–July 9, 2010,
Annex I, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/63/17; GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2010)
(“Any arbitrator may be challenged if circumstances exist that give rise to
justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence.”).
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legal services including those offered in international arbitration.
Cooperation among businesses increases in order to meet new
market opportunities. In such context where large international law
firms are serving clients in many jurisdictions, potential conflicts are
also increasing. As was pointed out by Professor El Kosheri, “[w]hat
matters in the large majority of cases is not the existence of business
or personal relations, but the declaration of such relations by the
arbitrator. It is secrecy that is the problem.”
In this area, the Court of Appeal of Paris recently handed down a
number of important decisions that added significant detail regarding
an arbitrator’s obligation to disclose. The first is the judgment of
September 9, 2010 in Allaire v. SGS Holding. Allaire, alleged in the
arbitration proceedings that the co-arbitrator nominated by SGS had a
significant consulting practice with the defendant’s counsel. The coarbitrator replied that he had indeed provided such services to the
law firm representing the defendant but added that he had not done
any work for this law firm since the beginning of the arbitration.
However, he declined to give any further information as to the
amount of fees received for his consultancy work. The Court held
that the co-arbitrator’s relationship with the defendant’s counsel was
neither occasional nor had it happened in the distant past and
concluded that such circumstances could give rise to reasonable
doubts in the claimants’ eyes. It decided to annul the award that had
been rendered by the arbitral tribunal within twelve days after the
information given to the parties by the co-arbitrator, finding that
Allaire had raised objections relating to the constitution of the
arbitral tribunal in the course of the arbitration. Therefore, the matter
was not estopped from being heard before the Court.
In two other decisions from March 2011, Nykcool v. Dole France
and Agrunord et al. and Tecso v. Neoelectra Group, the Court of
Appeal annulled awards for lack of independence and impartiality of
the arbitrators. In Nykcool, all the members of the arbitral tribunal
declined to make any statement regarding their independence. The
chairman, on behalf of the Arbitral Tribunal, merely expressed the
arbitrators’ regret about the claimant’s suspicious attitude. The Court
of Appeal held that the arbitrators’ refusal to disclose their
relationships with the parties raised a reasonable doubt about their
independence and impartiality. Moreover, it stressed that the coarbitrator nominated by the defendants was involved in other arbitral
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proceedings with the defendants. The Court’s holding, that
arbitrators should disclose their relationships with parties, deserves
total approval.
For example, in Tecso, the co-arbitrator nominated by the
defendant had been of counsel between 1989 and 2000 with the same
law firm as defendant’s counsel in the arbitration and had given only
vague information regarding his activity with said law firm after
2000. The Court of Appeal found that this attitude gave rise to
reasonable doubts regarding the co-arbitrator’s independence and
impartiality.
These three cases shed light on the practical application of the
arbitrator’s obligation to disclose all circumstances concerning the
existence of professional and financial association with counsel in
the case. When an arbitrator knows of a potential conflict, a failure to
disclose is indicative of a lack of independence. The Allaire
judgment notes the “elliptic character” of the statement made by the
impugned co-arbitrator and the Tecso case refers to the vague
information provided by the co-arbitrator nominated by the
defendant about the number of legal opinions given to the law firm
of defendant’s counsel after 2000. In Nykcool, no disclosure was ever
made. The arbitrators’ failure or spontaneous refusal to disclose their
relationships with the parties’ counsel, as well as their continued
failure to disclose full information in this regard, so seriously
affected the relationship of confidence with the parties that they
could no longer be trusted regarding the accuracy of the information
finally disclosed.
Sobrior and Potier v. ITM and La Violette, decided by the Paris
Court of Appeal on July 1, 2011, illustrates the opposite situation
where the chairman had on his own initiative disclosed to the parties
at an early stage in the arbitration that he had chaired arbitral
tribunals in cases involving the franchisor party and mass marketing
businesses. Although the chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal had failed
to disclose a prior appointment as arbitrator by a franchising
company unrelated to the group of companies of the franchisor party
involved in the arbitration proceedings, the Court of Appeal held that
the chairman’s incomplete statement raised no doubts as to his
independence or impartiality.
The aforementioned case law is an invitation to arbitrators to
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disclose any kind of relationship they may have with the parties and
their counsel, even at the risk of appearing overly cautious.

D. WHEN AND HOW A REVIEW OF AN
INSTITUTIONAL DECISION ON INDEPENDENCE
AND IMPARTIALITY OF ARBITRATORS SHOULD
TAKE PLACE
The existence or absence of independence and impartiality on the
part of an arbitrator in the challenge of an award proceeding is a
question over which French Courts enjoy full reviewing power.47 For
reasons that pertain to the loyalty and efficiency of the proceedings,
the issue of the independence and impartiality of an arbitrator must
be raised, whenever possible, in the course of the arbitration
proceedings in order to be considered as an admissible ground for
challenge of the validity of the award.48 In a similar vein, arbitration
rules provide for a time limit for bringing a request for challenge
after information of the facts or circumstances on which the
challenge is based.49 It is a well-settled question in French arbitration
law that the Rules of the arbitration institution nominated in the
arbitration agreement “[c]onstitute the laws of the parties and must
be applied to the exclusion of all other laws.”50 The contractually
47. See Phillipe Leboulanger, Note, Cour de cassation (1re Ch. Civile) 6
Janvier 1987, 1987 REV. ARB. 469, 473 (1987) (stating that the Supreme Court for
Judicial Matters held that Courts of Appeal are not restricted in their ability to
examine both the legal and factual elements concerning allegedly flawed
arbitration).
48. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,
July 6, 2005, 2005 REV. ARB. 993 (Fr.) (finding that a failure to raise objections at
the time of arbitration makes later objections inadmissible under the doctrine of
estoppel); see also CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 1466 (Fr.) (“A party
which knowingly and without good cause fails to timely object to an irregularity
during arbitration is deemed to have wavier the right to appeal.”).
49. See C.P.C. art. 1468 (“The arbitrator shall fix a date on which the matter
will adjourn for deliberation. After this date, no objection or motion may be made.
No representations may be made nor evidence produced, except at the request of
the arbitrator.”).
50. Raffineries de Homs et de Banias, supra; see also C.P.C., art. 1485 (“When
a court hears an action to set aside an arbitration award, it decides the merits within
the same framework as the arbitrator, unless the parties agree otherwise.”); see also
Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris,
Oct. 28, 1988, 1990 REV. ARB. 497 (Fr.) (stating that the question of alleged lack
of independence and impartiality may only be analyzed by reference to the Rules
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agreed upon time limit in the Arbitration Rules is binding on the
arbitration institution and the parties, but it does not bind the court
that has an independent assessment on the admissibility of lack of
independence and impartiality as a ground for challenging the award.
The reviewing court exercises a different type of control than that of
the arbitration institution.51 This does not preclude the courts from
reviewing the exercise of powers of the arbitration institution in
connection with challenge or replacement of an arbitrator in
proceedings on the validity of the award.52
In the case of an institutional or administered arbitration, however,
no judicial recourse can lie against the decision of an arbitration
institution, either by way of a setting aside action as ruled by the
Court of Appeal of Paris in the Opinter judgment of 1985 or by way
of a direct attack as decided in 1985 by the same Court in the
Raffineries d’Homs et de Banias case.53 There is only an indirect
review in the course of the challenge proceedings of the award if it is
impugned on the ground of an irregularity in the constitution of the
arbitral tribunal.54 This absence of judicial remedy explains in the
context of the prohibition of any interference by State Courts in the
organization and implementation of the arbitral proceedings by the
arbitral institution whenever such institution has acted in accordance
with its rules. Moreover, the Court of Appeal of Paris ruled in
of Arbitration of the French Association for Cocoa Commerce because the
arbitration agreement stipulated those Rules should be applied).
51. Compare C.P.C. art. 1485 (“An arbitration award is not subject to objection
or appeal.”), with Leboulanger, supra note 47 (explaining that, although parties
may not directly appeal an arbitration award, a Court of Appeal may examine how
the arbitrators reached decided the award and whether they violated any rules to
which they are subject).
52. See Leboulanger, supra note 47 (explaining that an appellate court may
review whether arbitrators should have been removed for failing to the conditions
of the arbitration contract).
53. Ernest Mezger, Note, Cour d’appel de Paris (1re Ch. suppl.) 15 janvier
1985, 1986 REV. ARB. 87 (1986) (stating that when an arbitration is
institutionalized, French law respects the freedom of the parties to contract for
these rules and the removal of an arbitrator should therefore be through the
institution’s rules and not judicial review so long as an award has not yet been
rendered).
54. See Leboulanger, supra note 47 (holding when a Court of Appeals hears a
challenge to an award, it is limited to hearing issues related to violations of the
rules of the arbitration and the rights of the defense and may not hear arguments
relating to the award itself).
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Raffineries d’Homs et de Banias that a decision on challenge of the
ICC International Court of Arbitration is an administrative measure
and does not have the legal nature of a judicial act.55 Because the
ICC International Court of Arbitration does not perform a judicial
function, the finality of the decision on a challenge that is laid down
in the ICC Arbitration Rules does not preclude public Courts from
reviewing independence and impartiality of arbitrators as an
independent ground of challenge of the award.56 Final decision on
independence and impartiality of arbitrators is also in English law
and not left to the decision of the arbitration institution. The
provisions of the 1996 English Arbitration Act57 concerning the
requirements of impartiality are regarded as matters of mandatory
public policy and, as a result, the Courts make a final determination
on the issue.58
A distinction should be drawn between two situations. In the first
case, like in Opinter,59 the arbitration institution rejects the challenge
of the arbitrator. Therefore, the issue revolves around the
independence and impartiality of the said arbitrator, who has
rendered the award to be examined by the Court in the context of a
review. In the second case, such as was the case in Raffineries de
Homs et de Banias, the challenge of the arbitrator had been accepted
by the arbitration institution. The decision of the ICC international
Court of Arbitration took immediate effect, and a new arbitrator had
been nominated. Is the solution of awaiting the making of the award

55. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, May 15, 1985, 1985
REV. ARB. 141 (Fr.).
56. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Jan. 12,
1996, 1996 REV. ARB. 428 (Fr.) (holding that it is an undisputed that courts may
review the independence and impartiality of arbitrators).
57. Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 24(1)(a) (U.K.) (granting courts the power,
upon application by a party, to remove an arbitrator when “circumstances exist that
give rise to justifiable doubts as to the [the arbitrator’s] impartiality”).
58. Lord Steyn, England: The Independence and/or Impartiality of Arbitrators
in International Commercial Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, INDEPENDENCE OF ARBITRATORS: 2007 SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT 91, 95
(2008) (stating that parties may not leave the final decision on independence and
impartiality to be decided under the rules of an institutional arbitration court, but
that a legal court has the final determination as a matter of public policy).
59. See Mezger, supra note 53 (holding that where an arbitrator has failed to
recuse himself upon a request by a party, an appeal may be taken after the award is
finalized so long as a timely objection is made).
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before challenging it on the ground of an improper constitution of the
arbitral tribunal such as established by the case law of the Court of
Appeal of Paris in 1985 in Raffineries de Homs et de Banias a
satisfactory one? Without waiting for the award, shouldn’t the
damage be cured by a review of the arbitration institution’s decision
to accept the challenge?
It must be acknowledged that review of the independence and
impartiality of arbitrators at the setting aside or enforcement of
award stage becomes devoid of much sense when an arbitrator has
been replaced by the arbitration institution in the course of the
arbitration proceedings. If the objecting party can adduce evidence
that the arbitration institution has failed to act in pursuance of its
Rules, there is room for intervention of the court acting in support of
the arbitration.60 This solution can be deduced from the Sté
Chérifienne des Pétroles judgment of 1991.61 The aggrieved party
may also bring proceedings against the arbitration institution to hold
it liable for its action in connection with the challenge.62 Such
judicial action would not characterize as interfering in the arbitration
proceedings because the review of the administrative decision of the
arbitration institution actually remains outside the exercise of the
arbitral tribunal’s power to adjudicate the merits of the dispute.
It has been held by the Court of Appeal of Paris that courts cannot
suspend or terminate the contract between the arbitration institution
and the parties to the arbitration agreement as soon as the arbitral
tribunal has been constituted.63 The arbitration agreement, which is
60. See CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 1459 (Fr.) (granting Courts
of Grande Instance jurisdiction to support arbitration proceedings); Leboulanger,
supra note 47 (holding that a court may review whether an arbitrator followed the
rules of arbitration); see also Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of
original jurisdiction] Paris, Jan. 18, 1991, 1996 REV. ARB. 503, 505 (Fr.) (holding
a court may not interfere with the procedures of an arbitration unless a violation of
the agreed rules for arbitration is acknowledged or proven by a party).
61. TGI Paris, 18 January 1991, Sté Chérifienne des Pétroles v. CCI, Rev. arb.
1996.503, note by Ph. Fouchard.
62. See Pierre Bellet, Note, Tribunal de grande instance de Paris (référé) 13
julliet 1988 – société R.E.C.E.C. et Pharaon v. société Uzinexport Import et
Chambre de commerce internationale, 1989 REV. ARB. 97, 101 (Fr.) (positing that
a party may claim damages against an institutional arbitrator if it has committed a
gross violation of the rules of arbitration).
63. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e civ., Nov. 18, 1987,
1988 REV. ARB. 657 (Fr.) (reversing the judgment of a trial court to suspend an
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within the exclusive purview of the arbitral tribunal according to the
competence-competence principle, must be carefully distinguished
from the agreement of the parties to the arbitration with the
arbitration institution.64 In the Cubic case for example, the Court of
Appeal of Paris and the Cour de cassation ruled over a claim to hold
the contract with the ICC void.65 In a like manner, in the case of
Raffineries de Homs et de Banias, the damage claim by this Syrian
party against the ICC for the alleged wrongful dismissal of the coarbitrator nominated by them raised no concern regarding the
arbitrators’ jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the dispute.
Moreover, Raffineries de Homs adduced no evidence that the ICC
violated its Rules, and its claim was held inadmissible.
The exclusion of all direct legal remedy against the challenge
decision made by an arbitral institution raises an issue regarding the
right of access to a court that is protected by Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.66 Regardless of its nature,
administrative or other, the challenge of an arbitrator is a decision
with important consequences for the arbitration and should be
arbitration on the grounds that the proper supportive role of a court is to allow
arbitrators space to fulfill their responsibilities to provide a fair arbitration through
the exercise of powers legitimately given by consent of the parties).
64. See CLAY, supra note 2, at 115 (defining the competence-competence
principle as the ability of the arbitral tribunal to determine the extent of its
jurisdiction to hear matters relating to the arbitration agreement); id. at 153 (stating
that both the travaux préparatoires of the UNCITRAL Model Law and French
jurisprudence recognize the distinction between the express autonomy of
arbitration agreements and the principle of competence-competence).
65. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e civ., Sept. 15,
1998, 1999 REV. ARB. 103, 109–10 (Fr.) (holding that where it is shown that party
clearly manifested its acceptance of an arbitration agreement, the trial court was
correct to rule that the contract was valid and that arbitration must proceed as laid
out therein); see also Thomas Clay, Note, Cour de cassation (1re Ch. civile) 20
février 2001, 2001 REV. ARB. 511 (2001) (offering that the validity of an
arbitration agreement in a contract should be distinguished by reference to the
particular center for arbitrage: if the contract is ambiguous about the reference, it
will only be valid if the parties both agree to the center expressly or implicitly; if
the contract is specific about the center, it will be valid as soon as one party
contacts the center, thereby completing the offer and acceptance necessary to form
a common law contract).
66. See Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 12–18 (1975)
(holding that the right to bring a civil claim before a court is fundamental, and
positing that if this right is remote or effective access a court is hindered, even in a
temporary character, that the claimant may have been denied this right).
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distinguished from the administrative and organizational decisions
otherwise made by the arbitration institution. There should be room
for an immediate application to the court against the decision on
challenge of the arbitration institution. As a consequence, the
position of the French courts should be reversed.

